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Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth
MICHELA MASSIMI
University of Edinburgh
In this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientiﬁc perspectivism being compati-
ble with realism. I clarify the rationale for scientiﬁc perspectivism and the problems and challenges that
perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and
on ways in which truth can be understood in perspectival terms. I offer a cost-beneﬁt analysis of each of
them and defend a version that in my view is most promising in living up to realist expectations.
I. Introduction
Among the many varieties of realism and antirealism in science, perspectival realism is
the latest attempt at bypassing dichotomous divisions. Perspectival realism promises to
be a house with two mansions where realists can ﬁnd shelter from relativism, while Kuh-
nians may ﬁnd refuge against ‘objectivist’ realism.1 Central to the view thus stated is the
metaphysical tenet that states of affairs about the world are perspective-independent;
whereas our scientiﬁc knowledge claims about these states of affairs are perspective-
dependent. That there are electrons is a state of affair about nature and its ultimate
constituents. But that electrons have half-integral spin (as opposed to being structural fea-
tures of an elastic ether) depends (in some sense to be clariﬁed) on our currently accepted
scientiﬁc perspective.
Can our scientiﬁc knowledge claims be perspectival, while also being claims about
the world as it is? The perspectival realist seems hard-pressed to elucidate the prima facie
attractive distinction between perspective-independent states of affairs versus perspective-
dependent knowledge claims. After all, either electrons are structural elements of an elas-
tic ether. Or, they are not. And scientiﬁc knowledge claims about electrons should stand
true or false accordingly (independently of any scientiﬁc perspective in which they might
be couched). The missing link between perspective-independent states of affairs and per-
spective-dependent knowledge claims is a notion of perspectival truth, my topic here.
What is it like to be true within a scientiﬁc perspective? Is perspectival truth a coherent
notion in the balancing act between realism and relativism in science?
The prospects of defending a suitable version of perspectival truth are not as
unpromising as they might seem. For perspectival truth—I argue—is neither truth
1 See Giere (2006).
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indexed to a scientiﬁc perspective; nor truth relative to a scientiﬁc perspective. It is
instead still the realist’s truth, tracking perspective-independent states of affairs. Yet, it is
perspectival because it meets contextual truth-conditions, which I understand as standards
of performance-adequacy laid out by any given scientiﬁc perspective. For perspectival
truth to become then a live option in the realism debate in philosophy of science, the per-
spectival realist owes us an account of how meeting standards of performance-adequacy
pertinent to a given scientiﬁc perspective may be compatible with tracking perspective-
independent states of affairs. Such an account is expected to take care of perspectival
truth understood not just as truth across diachronic (Kuhnian-like) scientiﬁc perspectives,
but also across synchronic (model-based) scientiﬁc perspectives.2 I argue that when faced
with pressing metaphysical questions about the properties of water, electrons, atoms, or
else, the perspectival realist should not waver. For it is possible to be realist about
science, while also taking on board the situated and perspectival nature of our scientiﬁc
knowledge claims.
This paper attends to this task. Section II clariﬁes the nature of both the realist and
the perspectivalist considerations at play in a viable notion of perspectival truth. Sec-
tion III presents three main kinds of perspectival truth that in different ways aim to rec-
oncile the realist and the perspectival rationales. Their respective problems are assessed
in Section IV. A fourth way of thinking about truth within a perspective is defended in
Section V, where its prospects are scrutinized vis-a-vis mounting challenges coming from
realist and antirealist quarters.
II. The normativity of realism and the perspectival threat
What is it like to be true within a scientiﬁc perspective? And why does this question
matter? Consider a scientist, for example J.J. Thomson, at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, working on cathode rays within a broadly Lorentzian electromagnetic worldview.
On this worldview, electrons were the minimal unit of electric charge embedded in an
elastic ether. With his experiments on cathode rays, J.J. Thomson concluded that cathode
rays consisted of corpuscles with a certain mass-to-charge ratio. Thomson did not identify
his ‘corpuscles’ with Lorentz’s or Larmor’s ‘electrons’, for after all his corpuscles were
not features of an elastic ether.
What is to be said about J.J. Thomson’s scientiﬁc knowledge claims? To an extent,
they did track perspective-independent states of affairs (e.g., the mass-to-charge ratio of
the entity at work in cathode rays). Yet, they were so intertwined with the scientiﬁc per-
spective of the time (in terms of ether vs. corpuscles) that to the eyes of a contemporary
2 In what follows I use the term “scientiﬁc perspective” loosely to refer to the actual—historically and
intellectually situated—scientiﬁc practice of any real scientiﬁc community at any given historical time.
I understand scientiﬁc practice broadly to include: (i) the body of scientiﬁc knowledge claims
advanced by the scientiﬁc community at the time; (ii) the experimental, theoretical, and technological
resources available to the scientiﬁc community at the time to reliably make those scientiﬁc knowledge
claims; and (iii) second-order (methodological-epistemic) claims that can justify the scientiﬁc knowl-
edge claims so advanced. Diachronically, in the history of science, Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian
mechanics, and so forth are examples of what I call a scientiﬁc perspective. Synchronically, at any
given time in the history of science, rival modeling practices for the same target system are also
examples of what I call a scientiﬁc perspective. Despite important dissimilarities between the diachro-
nic and the synchronic notion of scientiﬁc perspective, for my present purpose in this paper I will not
make a distinction between the two, and I will use the term “scientiﬁc perspective” to refer to both
interchangeably.
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scientist, they would hardly qualify as still true about electrons. When stated thus and so,
the problem is not new. It has been the battleground of real realism, semi-realism, and
structural realism for decades.3 It has even triggered historiographical disputes about who
really discovered the electron.4
But the question that is still wide open—my meta-question here—does not con-
cern what we can be realist about (e.g. electrons as opposed to the ether). But
instead, how we can be realist at all, once we take seriously the lesson coming from
the history of science. Truth within a perspective invites us to pause and think
about how it may be possible for our scientiﬁc knowledge claims to track perspec-
tive-independent states of affairs within the ever-changing bounds of scientiﬁc
perspectives.
The scientiﬁc realist is not going to be too impressed by this perspectival move. For
the one true theory about the electron (or the atom, or anything else) is regarded as an
asymptotic limit towards which scientists are marching across centuries of heroic efforts,
building on their predecessors, and getting some things right (and some other things
wrong) about the object under investigation.5
This irenic realist picture, sadly, ﬂies in the face of the epistemic pluralism that is so
distinctive of scientiﬁc inquiry. Both across historical periods, and in any given histori-
cal period, science witnesses a plurality of models, theories, experimental techniques,
and measurement apparatuses—all designed to investigate the very same target system.
It is not just that our theories of the electron have shifted remarkably over a century to
the point that one can ask whether J.J. Thomson’s electron is the same as Bohr’s elec-
tron, or Dirac’s electron, or QED electron.6 But also within the current scientiﬁc per-
spective, thirty inconsistent models of the atomic nucleus, four main families of
incompatible models for the atom, three different experimental procedures (in vitro,
in vivo, in silico) for protein folding can be found.7 The scientiﬁc realist’s temptation to
sweep this epistemic pluralism under a rug in the name of the One True Theory faces a
reality check.
Scientiﬁc practice forces us to take on board the ubiquitous phenomenon of epistemic
pluralism in science, and to re-think accordingly the epistemological tenet behind scien-
tiﬁc realism that acceptance of a theory involves the belief that the theory is true. Our
beliefs about which theory is true do change over time and across scientiﬁc perspectives.
Epistemic pluralism and perspectival considerations of this kind should shake the realist’s
3 See Kitcher (2001), Chakravartty (1998), French (2014).
4 Falconer (2001).
5 For example, a scientiﬁc realist might think that J.J. Thomson’s scientiﬁc knowledge claims are either
true or false. Some of them (i.e. the mass-to-charge ratio) turned out to be true. Others (i.e. the so-called
plum-pudding model of the atom) were simply false. A scientiﬁc realist would then insist that there are
perspective-independent states of affairs that count as the ﬁnal tribunal for the truth or falsity of scientiﬁc
claims and that is all there is to be said about truth in science, perspectivism notwithstanding. Or better,
a scientiﬁc realist would insist that the situated nature of our scientiﬁc knowledge does not affect what
can be said about which knowledge claims count as true and which count as false. But the main problem
with this scientiﬁc realist view is that it explains away the ubiquitous phenomenon of incompatible or
even inconsistent scientiﬁc perspectives, a phenomenon that—as we are going to see—cannot be easily
dismissed.
6 See Bain and Norton (2001).
7 See Morrison (2011), Chakravartty (2010), Mitchell and Gronenborn (forthcoming).
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epistemological tenet about believing the theory to be true.8 For, after all, if our scientiﬁc
knowledge is situated, perspectival, and hence inevitably pluralistic, how can anyone ever
be in the position of knowing whether her belief that the theory x is true is indeed cor-
rect? How could J. J. Thomson ever know that his belief about the electron as a corpus-
cle with a certain mass-to-charge ratio was indeed true (as opposed to Joseph Larmor’s
belief about the electron being a structural element of an elastic ether)? Moreover, both
scientists couched their scientiﬁc knowledge claims in the language of ‘corpuscles’ and
‘ether’ (respectively) that is no longer ours, and it does not map onto what we take to be
perspective-independent states of affairs about the electron by our own lights now.
Perspectival truth becomes then an invitation to pause and think about how we may
still be realist about science despite this epistemic pluralism and the ever-changing
bounds of our scientiﬁc perspectives (historical and not). One may then ask what is the
minimal realist commitment that should be upheld in cashing out a viable notion of per-
spectival truth. And, vice versa, why perspectivalism poses a hurdle to it. This Section ad-
dresses these two related questions.
Minimal realist commitment, ﬁrst. A minimal realist commitment can be found, a
commitment that proves resilient to mounting challenges from the history of science, or
rival inconsistent models in contemporary science. Getting things right is not a dispos-
able commodity, nor a matter for voluntaristic stances. Getting things right is at the heart
of the realist programme: constructive empiricists, instrumentalists, relativists, and con-
structivists do not share the same commitment, because they do not share with the realist
a suitable notion of ‘rightness’. Getting things right is not the aim of science, because it
is not what science should aspire to (assuming one has realist leanings). Instead, it is
what science ought to do by realist lights. Science ought to map onto reality in a truthful
way. Thus, to judge a scientiﬁc theory or model as true is to judge it as one that ‘com-
mand our assent’. It is this normative dimension (implicit in the epistemological compo-
nent: i.e. believing that theory x is true) that antirealist views typically lack (imagine a
constructivist intimating that scientiﬁc theories ought to make facts; or a conceptual rela-
tivist prescribing that scientiﬁc facts ought to be relative).9 Getting things right is a norm
about what we take science to be about; i.e. mapping onto nature in a truthful way, in
the simple-minded sense of making our scientiﬁc knowledge claims correspond to
8 Of the three distinctive components of scientiﬁc realism (metaphysics, epistemology, and semantics), it is
only the epistemological component that is here under question (for this threefold deﬁnition of scientiﬁc
realism, the locus classicus is Psillos 2000). Perspectival realism, as I like to understand it, shares with
scientiﬁc realism the metaphysical component (i.e. mind-independent and perspective-independent states
of affairs) and the semantic component (i.e. the language of science must be read literally). But it parts
its way from scientiﬁc realism because it understands the epistemological component (belief in the truth
of the theory) as subject to the aforementioned perspectival question (i.e. how can anyone ever be in the
position of knowing whether her belief that the theory X is true is indeed correct?). Thus, my goal in this
paper is to re-think this epistemological component so as to make progress on the broader issue of per-
spectival realism, as a live contender in the debate over realism in philosophy of science. It is not my
intention to come up with a new theory of truth that bypasses the classical correspondence theory of
truth, or alternative theories of truth (i.e. coherence or warranted assertibility or else). Instead, my goal is
to clarify what it is like to be a realist about science while also acknowledging that our beliefs in the
truth of any scientiﬁc theory are inevitably situated and perspectival.
9 A possible exception here is constructive empiricism, which might intimate that scientiﬁc theories ought
to be empirically adequate, as opposed to getting things right, where being empirically adequate does not
commit to any truthful mapping of a mind-independent reality. Yet this possible normative dimension
seems at odds with van Fraassen’s (2002) empirical stance and voluntarism.
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perspective-independent states of affairs that can adjudicate their truth or falsity. Thus, a
notion of perspectival truth that wants to be kosher to the realist programme must fulﬁll
this minimal realist commitment, in the ﬁrst instance.
However, perspectival considerations pose a hurdle to the prospect of fulﬁlling this
minimal realist commitment. After all, how can anyone ever know that she/he is indeed
getting things right? The default realist answer to this question takes the form of an
argument from success. For it would seem that scientiﬁc knowledge claims are true (or
get things right) to the extent that they are either explanatorily or predictively successful
(or both). Hence, justiﬁcation for the belief that theory x is true (or gets things right) seems
to accrue via a suitable notion of scientiﬁc success—what I am going to call success from
nowhere. A scientiﬁc knowledge claim that lacks the distinctive mark of success (in expla-
nation or prediction) is false, on pain of miracles and cosmic coincidences, no matter in
which perspectival idiom might be couched. Let success be our guide!
Yet critics have not failed to note that this realist notion of success is problematic. For
either it is all-inclusive, by the standards of success of each historical period (be it nine-
teenth-century ether theory, or ancient Greek crystalline spheres). Or, it is exclusive, at
the cost of having to provide an ex post facto justiﬁcation for what counts as success in
science (electrons-qua-leptons are successful, but Thomson’s corpuscles or Larmor’s elec-
trons were unsuccessful).10 Whose success (the perspectivalist asks)? And by whose
lights? Surely, Thomson’s corpuscles (and his belief in their truth) proved successful in
the late nineteenth century scientiﬁc perspective, as much as belief in electrons-
qua-leptons is successful in our own current scientiﬁc perspective. The scientiﬁc realist’s
notion of success harks back to an implausible view from nowhere that is at odds with
historical records and epistemic pluralism.
On the other hand, perspectival considerations (and the epistemic pluralism that
accompanies them) seem to force the argument from success to buy into a view of suc-
cess either from everywhere or from here now, neither of which is promising in deliver-
ing on the minimal realist commitment.11 It is the very normative dimension of realism
that is in fact threatened by perspectival considerations, in their historical form and not.
In their historical form, scientiﬁc perspectives seem to shun universal rules and cross-
perspectival norms. For core to the perspectivalist project is the Kuhnian idea that differ-
ent professional communities, as “producers and validators of scientiﬁc knowledge”12
disagree about the tools and norms relevant to their scientiﬁc inquiry. In their non-
historical form, scientiﬁc perspectives—qua rival incompatible models for the same target
system—seem to preclude the very possibility of cross-perspectival evaluation (e.g. What
is the right model for the atomic nucleus, among the thirty available ones? What are the
right properties of water in between hydrodynamics and statistical mechanics?).
Perspectival considerations of this kind might invite us to embrace a view of success
from everywhere, i.e., by the different standards and interests of different communities of
inquirers. But going down this route would jeopardize the very possibility of cashing out
a viable notion of perspectival truth, a notion that could serve the purpose of perspectival
realism qua a form of realism. The fortune of perspectival truth would be entangled with
the fortune of standards of rightness idiosyncratic to scientiﬁc perspectives. Success from
10 For a move along these lines, see for example, Stanford (2006) and (2009).
11 For more details about these various notions of scientiﬁc success, please see Massimi (forthcoming).
12 Kuhn (1962, p. 178).
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everywhere would deliver an impoverished perspectival truth incapable of tracking nat-
ure, getting things right, and ultimately grounding scientiﬁc knowledge claims as true,
i.e. as commanding our assent.
Prospects are not rosier for success from here now. Despite the temptation to retrieve
a privileged epistemic platform to assess scientiﬁc success—unsurprisingly perhaps, ours
now—such view would be too chauvinistic to do justice to knowledge claims of different
scientiﬁc perspectives. Moreover, such view would be self-defeating. After all, the index-
ical nature of success from here now would entitle Aristotelians, no less than Medieval
Scholastics, to reclaim as their own a notion of success from there then, from which con-
ﬂicting truths would ensue. A view of success from here now would produce a tensed
version of perspectival truth, whereby scientiﬁc knowledge claims true here and now
become false there and then as soon as new scientiﬁc perspectives come to the fore.
Should we safely conclude that the prospects of cashing out a viable notion of truth
within a perspective are doomed?
Not so fast. In the next Section three kinds of perspectival truth are presented. Each of
them, in different ways, promises to reconcile the minimal realist commitment of map-
ping onto nature truthfully with perspectival considerations about our scientiﬁc knowl-
edge claims being always cast within the bounds of speciﬁc scientiﬁc perspectives.
III. Three kinds of perspectival truth
Perspectival truth, with its minimal realist commitment and perspectival considerations,
needs be probed deeper. A good starting point is the exact nature of perspectival consid-
erations. What is it at stake in the platitude that scientiﬁc knowledge is always from a
particular vantage point? Perspectivalism in science is usually understood as capturing
the following view:
(P) Perspective-dependence. Knowledge claims in science are dependent on a given his-
torically and/or intellectually situated scientiﬁc perspective.
(P) is an epistemic view about scientiﬁc knowledge claims and their being historically
and/or intellectually situated.13 (P) is not a metaphysical view about reality. As such,
there is nothing in the perspective-dependence captured by (P) that is prima facie at odds
with the aforementioned normativity of realism, whereby theories ought to be true in the
simple-minded sense of corresponding to, or mapping onto (perspective-independent)
states of affairs in nature. Unsurprisingly, perspectivalism is usually presented as being
compatible with realism, and at a distance from relativism. Yet, (P) is a rather unqualiﬁed
claim, and in what follows I spell out three possible ways of understanding (P).14 A ﬁrst
natural way of understanding (P) is as follows:
13 Namely, their being situated in the historical context, say the caloric theory of the early nineteenth cen-
tury; or, in a particular intellectual context, for example Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics at the end of
the nineteenth century, or the current Standard Model in particle physics. Our task ahead is then to
clarify the ways in which (P) might be integrated with the epistemological component (i.e. belief that
theory x is true) typical of scientiﬁc realism, to produce a viable notion of perspectival truth (see foot-
note 8 above).
14 Perspectivalism has recently attracted attention in a variety of different ﬁelds in philosophy, where the
need of clarifying exactly what is at stake in the platitude of perspective-dependence has arisen. For per-
spectivalism in metaethics, see Schafer (2014); for causal perspectivalism, see Ismael (2016).
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(P1) Perspective-dependence1. Knowledge claims in science are perspective-dependent1
when their propositional contents depend on the scientiﬁc perspective in which such
claims are made.
(P1) captures what might be called a form of perspective-indexicality, following John
MacFarlane’s terminology.15 On this ﬁrst way of thinking about (P), scientiﬁc claims
such as <The Earth is orbiting the Sun>, or <The electron has half-integral spin>, or any
other, are akin to sentences such as <It is sunny here>. Such sentences have indexical
nature and express different propositional contents, depending on whether it is me utter-
ing the sentence <It is sunny here> today, 18th March 2016, in Edinburgh; or my friend
Mary today in Chicago. Similarly, on the 18th March 2016 the sentence <The Earth is
orbiting the Sun> expresses the proposition that the Earth is orbiting the Sun on the 18th
March 2016. But on the 8th September 1638 this sentence expressed a different proposi-
tion, namely that the Earth was orbiting the Sun on the 8th September 1638.
Expressing different propositional contents implies that different states of affairs (about
the Earth orbiting the Sun on the 18th March 2016 and on the 8th September 1638, respec-
tively) make these two propositions, respectively, true. Thus, perspective-dependence1—
understood as a form of perspective-indexicality—implies a ﬁrst kind of perspectival truth
whereby (historically or else) scientiﬁc perspectives can be regarded as providing different
truth-makers for seemingly identical knowledge claims. The indexicality at play in (P1)
needs not be understood as a temporal indexicality (as in the example above). It is instead,
ﬁrst and foremost, indexicality with respect to a given scientiﬁc perspective (hence the
temporal aspect of it, since scientiﬁc perspectives are temporally situated). Perspective-
indexicality seems to be a distinctive feature of the scientiﬁc representation that models
afford.16 On this view, scientiﬁc representation (like cartographic representation) is always
perspectival and indexical because it is always from a well-deﬁned vantage point, i.e. that
of the model employed for representing the target system. Although these discussions are
not usually framed in terms of propositional contents and truth-makers, the perspectival
and indexical nature of scientiﬁc representation can be understood in terms of different
contents/truth-makers that make model-based knowledge claims in science true.
But there is also a second way of understanding perspective-dependence:
(P2) Perspective-dependence2. Knowledge claims in science are perspective-dependent2
when their truth-values depend on the scientiﬁc perspective in which such knowledge
claims are made.
15 See MacFarlane (2009).
16 See Bas van Fraassen (2008, pp. 85–86, emphasis added): “Perspectivity and indexicality are closely
related but the distinction is of equal importance. The terms ‘perspective’ and ‘perspectival’ are central to
how we understand scientiﬁc representation. (. . .) a visual perspective has an origin—the painter’s eye in
one-point perspective being the paradigm example. Secondly, it has an orientation: the direction in which
this eye or camera is looking. Thirdly, the content of this visual perspective is expressible in an indexical
judgment ‘that is how it is from here, looking in this direction, with that my left, this my right, yonder
my above. . ..’ The question is least simple when it comes to verbal description. When is a description
perspectival? When it is a description from a certain point of view—but ‘point of view’ is subject to the
same ﬂuctuations in use as ‘perspective’. A hallmark we can look for in the case of language is the
occurrence of indexical terms or phrases. Among these I include demonstratives such as ‘this’, ‘those
yonder’, as well as the more obvious ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. (. . .) On the other hand I would resist
calling a description perspectival on the sole ground that some reference to the individual or communal
users’ experience is indispensable to understanding its terms”.
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(P2) captures a form of perspective-relativity whereby, by contrast with (P1), the proposi-
tional content expressed by a given scientiﬁc knowledge claim is the same in every sci-
entiﬁc perspective, but it takes different truth-values in different perspectives. On this
second way of thinking about perspective-dependence, scientiﬁc claims expressed by sen-
tences such as <The Earth is orbiting the Sun>, or <The electron has half-integral spin>,
or any other, express the same propositional content in every perspective (namely, that
the Earth is orbiting the Sun, and that the electron has half-integral spin). But while, say,
the ﬁrst proposition is deemed true in our perspective and in Galileo’s one, the same
proposition is deemed false in the Ptolemaic perspective.
Thus, perspective-dependence2—understood as a form of perspective-relativity—
implies a second kind of perspectival truth whereby different scientiﬁc perspectives
ascribe different truth-values to the same (perspective-invariant) content of a given
knowledge claim. (P2) relativises truth-values: it is a form of relativized truth. (P2) can
capture perspectival considerations about truth being relative to scientiﬁc perspectives17
while also maintaining that nature consists of well-deﬁned and perspective-invariant
states of affairs. On this view, that the Earth is orbiting the Sun, or that the electron has
half-integral spin are claims amenable to being either true or false in different scientiﬁc
perspectives, because of the speciﬁc way in which each perspective may deﬁne how per-
spectival models ﬁt (or do not ﬁt) the relevant states of affairs in the world.
Finally, here is a third possible way of thinking about (P):
(P3) Perspective-dependence3. Knowledge claims in science are perspective-dependent3
when their truth-conditions depend on the scientiﬁc perspective in which such claims are
made.
(P3) captures a form of perspective-sensitivity whereby the propositional content
expressed by a given knowledge claim is neither indexed to perspectives (pace P1), nor
invariant across perspectives with truth-values relativised to perspectives (pace P2). (P3)
delivers instead a form of contextualism: scientiﬁc perspectives provide the circumstances
or context of use deﬁning the truth-conditions for knowledge claims in science.18 (P3)
17 I read Ron Giere, (2006, p. 81, emphasis added), along the lines of P2: “Is perspectivism itself true or
false? If it is true, then there is at least one claim that is non-perspectivally true. So if perspectivism is
true, then it is false (. . .) So perspectivism is false. As I see it, this argument simply begs the question. It
assumes that truth has to be understood in objectivist terms, which is just what perspectivism denies. For
a perspectivist, truth claims are always relative to a perspective. (. . .) I focus on the physical characteris-
tics of instruments (including the human visual system) and principles deﬁning generalized models”.
Giere understands this as a claim about the physical characteristics of scientiﬁc instruments and principles
deﬁning what he calls “generalized models” so that “Claims about the truth of scientiﬁc statements or the
ﬁt of models to the world are made within paradigms or perspectives” (ibid., p. 82).
18 Apropos of DeRose’s contextualism, MacFarlane has pointed out the variety of meanings captured by the
idea that truth-conditions depend on context: “There are at least six different things that might be meant by
‘truth condition’ here: (i) function (in the mathematician’s extensional sense) from contexts to truth values,
(ii) rule for determining truth values based on features of context, (iii) function from circumstances of evalu-
ation to truth values, (iv) rule for determining truth values based on features of circumstances of evaluation,
(v) function from possible worlds (and perhaps times) to truth values, (vi) rule for determining truth values
based on features of possible worlds (and perhaps times). All of these notions can come apart. Because it is
rarely clear which of them is meant by ‘truth condition’, that term is best avoided altogether” (MacFarlane
2009, p. 236, ft 7). In what follows, I take truth-conditions to refer to “rules for determining truth values
based on features of the context” understood as context of use (i.e. the context in which the scientiﬁc claim
is made and employed). And the key idea is that such rules are laid out by the context of use.
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cashes out a different kind of perspective-dependence by making the truth-conditions for
any knowledge claim vary with the context of use.19 For example, the sentence <The
Earth is orbiting the Sun> can be taken as having truth-conditions that vary with the con-
text of use, depending on whether the sentence is uttered by me today (in which case its
value would be true); or it is uttered by Bellarmine in the context of Galileo’s trial (in
which case its value would be false). On this reading, scientiﬁc perspectives contextualize
truth-conditions for knowledge claims in science.20 Perspectival truth3 becomes then con-
textualized truth within the bounds of partial, conﬂicting, idealized representational
schemes or contexts of use (to use my terminology here). Consider the following exam-
ple:21
a. <Water is a liquid with viscosity>
The truth-conditions for this scientiﬁc knowledge claim are sensitive to the perspectival
context of use. If the context of use is hydrodynamics, which treats water as a ﬂuid hav-
ing fundamental properties such as density and viscosity, then a. is certainly true. If the
context of use is statistical mechanics, which treats water as a discrete statistical collec-
tion of molecules, then a. is false. Perspectival truth3 so deﬁned still abides by the mini-
mal realist commitment of getting things right; but it does not treat the propositional
content of our knowledge claims as ﬁxed and well-deﬁned independently of the context
of use. Truth with capital T recedes instead into an inaccessible and unspeakable realm.
In its place stand many scientiﬁc perspectives, each providing an access—partial, ideal-
ized, and imprecise that it may be—to a world of perspective-independent states of
affairs.
19 Perspective-sensitivity is akin to what MacFarlane would call use-sensitivity (see MacFarlane 2005). As a
result, (P3) entails (P2) because it makes the truth-values of scientiﬁc knowledge claims depend on the
speciﬁc circumstances or truth-conditions typical of a given context of use. But (P2) does not in turn
entail (P3). For (P2) assumes that the propositional content of a given knowledge claim is always well-
deﬁned and invariant across perspectives (even if its truth-value varies with perspectives). By contrast,
(P3) buys into the contextualist view that the propositional content of a given knowledge claim is unde-
termined until the truth-conditions inherent in the context of use have been speciﬁed. Thus, (P3) involves
a kind of indeterminacy in the propositional content that is alien to both (P1) and (P2), where the proposi-
tional content is always well-deﬁned (i.e. it is either indexed to perspectives, or invariant across perspec-
tives).
20 Recently, Paul Teller has advocated a view seemingly close to what I here call perspective-dependence3.
According to Teller, scientiﬁc perspectives should be understood as idealized representational schemes,
or idealized interpretations of the world that do not get things exactly right: “To attribute truth to a state-
ment is to evaluate it for success in its representational function. But in our messy world, such a success
is an exceedingly complex affair. As with any complex subject matter the best we can do is to offer ide-
alized models that get part of it ‘right’, which models we then evaluate for their strengths and weak-
nesses. This, in practice, is the best that science has to offer” (Teller 2011, p. 467). Teller argues that we
can transform false precise statements (e.g. “John’s height is six feet precisely”) into true yet imprecise
ones (e.g. “John’s height is six feet close enough”), where the latter can still function as a true represen-
tation of a real state of affair. In the suitable conditions of applications, both sentences count as true: the
ﬁrst despite its inaccuracy, and the second despite its imprecision. Teller call them “semantic alter-egos”
and compare what he calls the “conditions of applications” (i.e. the conditions under which the sentences
apply) to context-sensitive truth-conditions with two important caveats: (a.) no completely determined,
contextual ﬁll-in truth-conditions can in practice ever be identiﬁed; (b.) even if there were in practice a
mechanism to ﬁll in truth-conditions, no such mechanism would count as “executing a completely deter-
mined set of truth conditions” (Teller 2011 p. 469).
21 See again Teller (2011) for a similar example.
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How promising are these three different kinds of perspective-dependence in delivering
a viable version of perspectival truth? Their respective problems and prospects are
reviewed in the next Section.
IV. What prospects for perspectival truth?
Can (P1) deliver on the promise of truth within a perspective? (P1) invites us to regard
scientiﬁc knowledge claims as indexed to scientiﬁc perspectives, when their propositional
contents, or better their truth-makers depend on the scientiﬁc perspective in which such
claims are made. Following Armstrong’s truth-maker theory,22 let us take truth-makers to
be states of affairs that make a truth such <p> true in the sense of providing an ontological
or metaphysical ground for it.23 Central to perspectival truth1 are two key ideas: (i) that
truth is ontologically grounded in worldly states of affairs; and (ii) that the worldly states
of affairs that act as ontological grounds for scientiﬁc knowledge claims are perspectival,
i.e. inherent in a scientiﬁc perspective. Thus, indexing truths to scientiﬁc perspectives
means ﬁnding worldly states of affairs that can both act as ontological grounds, and be
inherent in a given scientiﬁc perspective. What worldly states of affairs are eligible
candidates for perspectival truth1 so understood?
A major problem affects perspectival truth1. For we are left with the conundrum of
explaining how in a different perspective (say, the Ptolemaic perspective), a knowledge
claim that in our current perspective is regarded as true (e.g. <The Earth is orbiting the
Sun>) may in fact be false. Simply saying that <The Earth is orbiting the Sun> is not a
truth in the Ptolemaic perspective would not do. A defender of perspectival truth1 owes
us an example of a worldly state of affair that can act as the truth-maker of the presumed
Ptolemaic truth <The Earth does not orbit the Sun>P. A defender of perspectival truth1 is
faced with two horns of a dilemma when trying to explain falsehood. Either to concede
that there may be knowledge claims in a given scientiﬁc perspective, which while held
true by a community of practitioners (e.g., Ptolemaic astronomers), are in fact tout court
false—i.e. there is no truth-maker for <The Earth does not orbit the Sun>P. Or, to insist
that scientiﬁc knowledge claims held true by a community of practitioners (e.g., Ptole-
maic astronomers) are indeed true, and then the burden is on defenders of perspectival
truth1 to identify possible truth-makers for such claims.
Neither of these two options is promising. The former collapses perspectival truth1 in
the simple-minded correspondence theory of truth dear to scientiﬁc realism. In so doing,
it undercuts the original motivation for perspectival truth as a distinctive middle ground
(if scientiﬁc knowledge claims of past or rival perspectives are simply false by our own
current light, what is the point of pursuing perspectival truth?). The latter option of
searching for a potential truth-maker for <The Earth does not orbit the Sun>P, seems to
land the defender of perspectival truth1 with an impossible task. What worldly state of
affairs can ontologically ground such Ptolemaic truth? Maybe, with some sophistry, an
argument could be made to the effect that states of affairs (qua truth-makers) are molded
by the scientiﬁc perspective in which they feature. But such move would place a
22 According to Armstrong (1997), a truth such as <a is F> should be understood as having as its truth-
maker the state of affair that [a is F], whereby such a state of affair, in Armstrong’s original formulation,
is not understood as the mereological sum of an individual a and universal property F-ness.
23 In what follows, I leave aside the issue of how to best understand states of affairs, i.e., whether in terms
of tropes, or particular objects instantiating universal properties instead.
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defender of perspectival truth1 on the slippery slope of fact-constructivism. Once on that
slope, it is hard to see how a defender of perspectival truth1 could possibly deliver on
the realist promise of getting things right.
Moving then away from the treacherous ground of truth-makers for perspective-
indexicality, perhaps perspective-dependence2 faces rosier prospects. After all, (P2) treats
the propositional content expressed by scientiﬁc knowledge claims as invariant across
scientiﬁc perspectives, whilst relativizing the truth-values of such propositional content
to different perspectives. Perspectival truth2 so understood seems in a good position to
explain disagreement in science. For it is possible that scientists endorsing different sci-
entiﬁc perspectives genuinely disagree about a shared subject matter, without talking past
each other (since the propositional content of their respective knowledge claims is the
same). Thus, perspectival truth2 seems more promising than perspectival truth1 in delivering
on the Kuhnian idea behind perspectivalism that scientists may effectively be ‘living in dif-
ferent worlds’ by attaching different truth-values to the same knowledge claims.
Yet truth-relative-to-scientiﬁc-perspectives proves itself problematic. We are reminded
here of Goodman’s familiar discussions about how different worlds (or scientiﬁc perspec-
tives that we may want to call them) bring along with them conﬂicting truths.24 Despite
being prima facie contradictory, the following two sentences
1. <The Earth is orbiting the Sun>
2. <The Earth is not orbiting the Sun>
are in fact both true within an appropriate scientiﬁc perspective. To reconcile conﬂicting
truths 1. and 2., one may follow Goodman’s suggestion and expand them as follows:
(1.i.) In the Ptolemaic perspective, the Earth is not orbiting the Sun.
(2.i.) In the Copernican perspective, the Earth is orbiting the Sun.
The problem with this classic move—as Goodman originally pointed out—is that the result-
ing knowledge claims (1.i) and (2.i) are no longer in conﬂict with each other (and hence can-
not be the source of genuine disagreement) because they are noncommittal as to the Earth’s
motion itself. They do not tell us whether the Earth moves or not, unless we add a further
clause that says that what each perspective claims is in turn true. Thus, despite invariant con-
tent, perspectival truth2 ends up being noncommittal as to what worldly states of affairs ulti-
mately obtain. This means that perspective-relativity fails to deliver on the normativity of
realism. Scientiﬁc theories with their knowledge claims cannot be expected to get things right
if they are non-committal about worldly states of affairs. Or, to echo Goodman, scientiﬁc the-
ories cannot be expected to get things right if no cross-perspectival notion of rightness is
within their grasp. Moreover, perspectival truth2 so understood fails to deliver also on the
Kuhnian dictum because the disagreement between communities is explained away by rela-
tivizing knowledge claims to perspectives. Can we improve on perspectival truth2?
Recall (P3) captures a form of perspective-sensitivity, whereby scientiﬁc perspectives
can be regarded as providing the circumstances or context of use deﬁning the truth-condi-
tions for knowledge claims in science. For example, we can interpret scientiﬁc models
(with their inaccurate idealizations of the target system) as ﬁlling in contextual truth-
24 Goodman (1978).
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conditions. Perspectival truth3 is then truth within the limits (afforded by rival scientiﬁc
models or rival historical perspectives) of inaccurate-yet-successful scientiﬁc representa-
tions of a perspective-independent world.
Perspectival truth3 has a seductive appeal. It is kosher to the normativity of realism in
getting (at least part of) things right via the representational success of our modeling
practices. At the same time, it accommodates the Kuhnian stance against the God’s eye
view by delegating to scientiﬁc perspectives (qua families of models) the task of offering
idealized, inaccurate, and yet still true perspectival images of an independent world. What
better prospect for truth within a perspective?
Here is a worry, and a possible way forward. The worry ﬁrst. Perspectival truth3
evokes the Kantian stereotype of a noumenal reality receding beyond the realm of
appearances (i.e. water-as-an-object-in-itself is not amenable to scientiﬁc knowledge;
water-as-an-object-of-experience is the subject of different scientiﬁc models, none of
which can claim to represent the properties of water as they are in themselves). If accuracy
is a never-achievable goal, all we are left with are idealized, perspectival images of a target
system. Scientiﬁc inquiry, like cartography, becomes a mapping exercise (with incomplete
and partial maps) of a world we never made. Perhaps this is all we can reasonably expect
from science. Perhaps we should not ask for more from perspectival truth.
Yet, I want to conclude with a note of optimism, and suggest that there is more that
we can expect from a notion of perspectival truth. If scientiﬁc perspectives display the
circumstances deﬁning the truth-conditions for knowledge claims in science, one might
expect different perspectives to disagree about the truth-conditions, and yet to allow for
cross-perspectival assessment. Should this intuition prove correct, a more promising way
of thinking about perspectival truth may be available to the perspectival realist. I pursue
this intuition in the next ﬁnal Section.
V. A fourth kind of perspectival truth
Let us take stock. Among the three kinds of perspectival truth analyzed so far, perspecti-
val truth3 was found the most promising in delivering on the normativity of realism
within the ever-changing bounds of scientiﬁc perspectives. Perspectival truth3 does not
incur into either the hefty metaphysical price of perspectival truth1 (whereby truth-makers
are indexed to perspectives), or into the non-committal approach of perspectival truth2.
Yet, perspectival truth3 still falls short of delivering on the normativity of realism
(science ought to get things right). It relegates reality into the Kantian realm of things-in-
themselves; and it leaves scientiﬁc knowledge claims with the task of mapping onto an
(in principle) unknowable world of states of affairs. The goal of this ﬁnal section is to go
back to the contextualist motivation behind perspectival truth3, elucidate some of its key
aspects, and move perspectival truth forward in a new direction. A good starting point is the
common distinction in epistemology between context of use and context of assessment.25
To see how this distinction can be helpfully deployed to cash out a fourth kind of per-
spectival truth, let us return for a moment to the aforementioned example of water, with
25 See MacFarlane (2005) for this distinction as functional to his defense of relativized truth. In what fol-
lows, I take on board the distinction between context of use and context of assessment but not with an
eye to defending relativized truth. Instead, I make use of this distinction to elucidate the contextualist
component at play in a fourth way of thinking about perspective-dependence.
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which the case for perspectival truth3 was illustrated. The truth-conditions for the sen-
tence:
a. <Water is a liquid with viscosity>
were said to be sensitive to the perspectival context of use: if the context of use is hydro-
dynamics, then a. is certainly true. But if the context of use is statistical mechanics, then
a. is false. Perspective-sensitivity—understood as sensitivity to the context of use deﬁned,
as in this case, by perspectival modeling practices—seems then not only to preclude
knowledge of the properties of water in and of themselves. It ultimately opens the door
again to a form of relativized truth, akin to the one at play in perspectival truth2. But—I
argue—the contextualist motivation behind perspective-sensitivity can be vindicated with-
out either giving up on knowing the properties of water in and of themselves, or falling
back onto relativized truth. Here is a possible way forward:
(P4) Perspective-dependence4. Knowledge claims in science are perspective-dependent4
when their truth-conditions (understood as rules for determining truth-values based on
features of the context of use) depend on the scientiﬁc perspective in which such claims
are made. Yet such knowledge claims must also be assessable from the point of view of
other (subsequent or rival) scientiﬁc perspectives.
If we switch from the context of use, to the context of assessment, we can imagine a
cross-perspectival assessor, who may be able to judge the truth-evaluable content of a.,
despite the different truth-conditions in hydrodynamics and statistical mechanics. For
such an assessor would be able to tell that although viscosity is indeed a fundamental
property of water in hydrodynamics,26 such property still features in statistical mechanics,
but this time as a derivative property (i.e. as the property of momentum transport across
laminae of mean ﬂow).27 Thus, in the context of assessment, it would not be the case
that a. is true in one perspective, but false in the other, depending on the context of use
deﬁning different perspectival truth-conditions for it.
Such an assessor would have rules that allow her to translate knowledge claims from the
context of hydrodynamics to the context of statistical mechanics so that she would conclude
that there is no loss in the truth-evaluable content of a. during the perspectival shift from hydro-
dynamics to statistical mechanics. More precisely, it may be possible to retrieve true knowl-
edge claims about what appears as a primitive property of water (viscosity) in hydrodynamics
from the statistical properties of molecules’ mean ﬂow in the statistical-mechanical perspective.
I suggest that we understand contextual truth-conditions in terms of standards of per-
formance-adequacy28 that a scientiﬁc knowledge claim (such as a.) has to satisfy. For a.
26 Viscosity features as a dimensionless variable, either as dynamic viscosity qua measure of internal resis-
tance, or as kinematic viscosity qua ratio of dynamic viscosity to the mass density.
27 I am grateful to Jed Buchwald for drawing my attention to this point.
28 The expression standards of performance-adequacy comes from Jay Rosenberg (2002, ch. 4), where it is
used for a defense of a perspectivalist theory of epistemic justiﬁcation. I use the expression standards of
performance-adequacy in a different way, to indicate the standards that must be met by scientiﬁc knowl-
edge claims for them to be retained across scientiﬁc perspectives, i.e. for their ongoing performance to be
judged as adequate by practitioners of different scientiﬁc perspectives. Hence, standards of performance-
adequacy capture the properly contextual, perspectival, and pragmatic features of the notion of truth
within perspectives that I am cashing out.
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to be true, for example, one would expect samples of water to satisfy the following stan-
dards of performance-adequacy: e.g. to obey the Navier-Stokes equations; to pass tests
involving measurements and calibrations involving other ﬂuids; to feature in projectible
generalisations that can in turn be used to build steam-engines and improve on their efﬁ-
ciency.29 Accuracy with respect to fundamental mathematical equations; empirical testa-
bility within the limits of well-deﬁned tests; projectibility and heuristic fruitfulness across
a variety of engineering practices, are just a few examples of the kind of standards of
performance-adequacy that perspectival contexts of use may put in place for determining
the truth-conditions of scientiﬁc knowledge claims. For <Water is a liquid with viscos-
ity> to be true within the perspective of hydrodynamics then, it is necessary that water is
indeed a liquid with viscosity and that it satisﬁes the appropriate standards of perfor-
mance-adequacy deﬁned by hydrodynamics.30 But there is more.
Despite their contextual nature, truth-conditions deﬁned by perspectival standards of
performance-adequacy (in any given context of use) must also be evaluable from the
point of view of other scientiﬁc perspectives. It is indeed possible to assess the perfor-
mance-adequacy of knowledge claims in hydrodynamics (e.g. <Water is a liquid with
dynamic viscosity of 1.983 9 10-5 Pa s>) from the point of view of non-equilibrium sta-
tistical-mechanics, where dynamic viscosity (g) can be retrieved from chaotic micro-
scopic dynamics using various approaches (e.g. the thermostated dynamical systems
approach or the escape-rate approach, for example).31
Things get more complex when it comes to scientiﬁc perspectives understood
diachronically, i.e. in historical terms. Consider the following two knowledge claims:
b. <The electron is a structural element of an elastic ether>
c. <The electron has half-integral spin>
Both are perspective-sensitive: their truth-conditions depend on the context of use. For
example, b. was deemed true in the late nineteenth century perspective of Lorentz and
Larmor. But it is deemed false in the contemporary quantum electrodynamics perspective.
Scientiﬁc knowledge claim c. was, in turn, deemed true in the perspective of the old
quantum theory (when Pauli originally introduced the electron spin in 1924 as a non-
classically describable ‘twofoldness’), and it is still true in the contemporary perspective
29 For an enlightening and up-to-date list of relevant features for water viscosity, the reader may want to
refer to International Association for the Properties of Water and Steam (IAPWS 2008): http://www.
iapws.org (last accessed 18 March 2016).
30 The realist would at this point ask: why do we need to add the second clause about satisfying the appropriate
standards of performance-adequacy? Would not the ﬁrst clause, i.e. that water is indeed a liquid with viscos-
ity, be enough for the purpose of establishing the truth of <Water is a liquid with viscosity>? The ﬁrst
clause, while indeed sufﬁcient to establish that there are perspective-independent states of affairs that make
the knowledge claim true, would not answer our key question here: i.e., how can anyone ever be in the posi-
tion of knowing that she/he is getting the properties of water right when advancing that knowledge claim?
Consider what would happen to a lone researcher, who gets things right about some object x and its proper-
ties without yet meeting the standards of performance-adequacy of her community at the time (perhaps
because such community has not quite got to the stage of precisifying standards able to capture the truth of
what the lone researcher has just discovered). Should we conclude that the researcher has contributed to the
advancement of knowledge about object x? Here, I cannot help but sharing Richard Boyd’s (2010, pp. 217–
218) negative answer to this question, although I give a perspectival gloss to what Boyd portrays as the
social dimension of scientiﬁc inquiry. For more details on this point, please see Massimi (forthcoming).
31 For a mathematical analysis of both these approaches, see Gaspard (1998).
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of particle physics. What makes us believe that c. is still true (despite perspectival
changes about how we think about the electron spin, i.e. no longer as a spinning top),
whereas we no longer believe b. to be true? Here is where the scientiﬁc realist would
reply that the electron spin is a real property of the electron, and in contrast the elastic
ether simply does not exist—end of the story.
Yet, the problem with this realist story, as explained in Section II, is that it presup-
poses a Nagelian view from nowhere from which such judgments of truth and falsity can
be made. We go back to the problem of success from nowhere vs success from here
now, and neither of them is very promising. Thus, a viable notion of perspectival truth
should be able to tell the difference between b. and c. without having to rely on any
dubious scientiﬁc realist’s notion of success from nowhere or from here now. And this is
where the Kuhnian-sounding standards of performance-adequacy enter the scene. While
being perspective-sensitive (i.e. the truth-conditions for these knowledge claims are,
respectively, sensitive to the nineteenth-century electromagnetic world view, the old
quantum theory, or the contemporary Standard Model), both these knowledge claims
ought to be assessable from the point of view of scientiﬁc perspectives other than the
original ones.
And, from our own current scientiﬁc perspective, we no longer believe b. to be true
because we now believe that b. has failed to satisfy the very same standards of perfor-
mance-adequacy it was meant to satisfy. For example, by being a structural element of
an elastic ether, the nineteenth-century electron was meant to explain, among others, phe-
nomena such as electric displacement (as in Maxwell’s honeycomb model of the ether,
where electric displacement was represented by tiny wheels moving across the ethereal
vortices allegedly at work in the phenomenon of electromagnetic induction). Momentous
scientiﬁc efforts by the best minds of the nineteenth-century physics (from Cauchy to
MacCullagh, among others) tried to tackle the problem of coming up with good engineer-
ing models of the ether for the transmission of electrical, magnetic, and optical phenom-
ena.32 The whole programme of ether dynamics reached an impasse by the end of the
nineteenth century precisely because these momentous efforts could not deliver models
of the ether that were accurate with respect to the experimental data, consistent with engi-
neering practices, able to feature in projectible generalisations and so on.
By contrast, scientiﬁc knowledge claim c. about the electron spin (despite signiﬁcant
perspectival changes from Pauli, to Dirac, to contemporary Standard Model), it is still
believed to be true because it continues to perform adequately with respect of standards
of performance-adequacy that it was meant to satisfy. For example, it features in pro-
jectible generalizations (e.g. the Pauli exclusion principle, which is regarded as a funda-
mental law of nature). It was and still is consistent with other accepted scientiﬁc theories
(e.g. it can be deduced from Dirac’s relativistic equation for the electron); and it is accu-
rate in ﬁtting available experimental data about particle classiﬁcations. Thus, despite their
contextual nature, truth-conditions deﬁned by perspectival standards of performance-ade-
quacy (in any given context of use) must also be evaluable from the point of view of
other scientiﬁc perspectives.
Each scientiﬁc perspective—I suggest—functions then both as a context of use (for its
own knowledge claims) and as a context of assessments (for evaluating the ongoing per-
formance-adequacy of knowledge claims of other scientiﬁc perspectives). Qua contexts of
32 For details about the history of ether theories, see Cantor and Hodge (1981).
FOUR KINDS OF PERSPECTIVAL TRUTH 15
use, scientiﬁc perspectives lay out truth-conditions intended as standards of performance-
adequacy for their own scientiﬁc knowledge claims. Qua contexts of assessments, scien-
tiﬁc perspectives offer standpoints from which knowledge claims of other scientiﬁc
perspectives can be evaluated. This double role of scientiﬁc perspectives is important in
cashing out a fourth version of perspectival truth that does not fall prey of any of the
aforementioned problems.
For meeting standards of performance-adequacy ﬁxed by the original context of use
is, of course, not sufﬁcient to establish the truth of any scientiﬁc knowledge claim. If sci-
entiﬁc perspectives were allowed to sanction the truth of their own knowledge claims by
their very own lights and standards, perspectival truth4 would be bankrupt. Every scien-
tiﬁc perspective could legitimize its own knowledge claims in the name of its own (gen-
uine or presumed) standards of performance-adequacy. Ancient Greek crystalline spheres
could be said to satisfy explanatory standards for the generation and corruption of entities
in the sub-Lunar sphere; as much as phlogiston could be said to satisfy standards of pre-
dictive power for combustion and calcination. Contextual truth-conditions (qua standards
of performance-adequacy) must be bridled to avoid perspectival truth4 to accrue too
easily.
Contexts of assessment can help with the task. For the same claim that meets truth-
conditions (qua standards of performance-adequacy) in a given context of use must also
be evaluable from the point of view of another scientiﬁc perspective. Insofar as knowl-
edge claims about, for example, properties of water previously identiﬁed (e.g. viscosity
in hydrodynamics) can be assessed and evaluated in the light of another scientiﬁc per-
spective (e.g. statistical mechanics), then <Water is a liquid with viscosity> can legiti-
mately be regarded as true. Mechanisms for cross-perspectival assessment do, of
course, vary in remarkable ways. Sometimes a knowledge claim true in a given scien-
tiﬁc perspective becomes a limiting case of a more general true knowledge claim in the
new scientiﬁc perspective. In other cases, appropriate inter-reduction rules between the
two perspectives may be found. In any case, insofar as knowledge claims about, say,
properties of water, of electrons, or planetary motion continue to be found (from the
point of view of a new scientiﬁc perspective) as still performing adequately, such
knowledge claims can be said to be true across scientiﬁc perspectives. This is perspec-
tival truth4—combining a contextualist, yet still bona ﬁde realist account of truth within
a perspective.
Thus, pace the perspective-sensitivity behind perspectival truth4, we can still be rea-
sonably optimistic about our partial, idealized, incompatible models getting the properties
of water (of atomic nuclei, of electrons, and so forth) right. This is, after all, good news
for perspectival realism for it shows how perspective-sensitivity does not have to be in
conﬂict with the realist plea for ‘getting things right’, properly understood. To conclude,
central to perspectival truth4 are the following two main features:
(i)Perspective-sensitivity revisited: knowledge claims in science are sensitive to the per-
spectival context of use putting in place appropriate standards of performance-adequacy
for deﬁning their truth or falsity.
(ii)Realist normativity revisited: knowledge claims in science that have been retained on
the basis of their ongoing performance-adequacy from the point of view of other (either
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synchronically rival or diachronically subsequent) perspectives, can justiﬁably be
regarded as ‘getting things right’.33
Is perspectival truth4 truth enough? Is not the normativity of realism demanding a
more robust take on ‘getting things right’, one that does not rely on a commitment
on behalf of epistemic agents to retain scientiﬁc knowledge claims that continue to
meet standards of performance-adequacy? Cross-perspectival agreement on the ongoing
performance-adequacy of knowledge claims might seem like a pyrrhic victory. After
all, the metaphysical quest for tracking perspective-independent states of affair is ulti-
mately complemented (not replaced) by an epistemic stance about agents, and their
ability to assess the continuing performance of other agents’ scientiﬁc knowledge
claims.
Is perspectival truth4 closer to Putnam’s warrented assertibility than to the realist
notion of truth as correspondence? I do not think so. Correspondence with perspective-
independent states of affair remains central to perspectival truth4. The standards of
performance adequacy do not fulﬁll the task of warranting what we can assert about the
electron or the properties of water; nor do they claim to replace truth as correspondence.
Instead, their task is simply to allow us to evaluate the ongoing performance of our
scientiﬁc knowledge claims across time and perspectival shifts, because we simply do
not possess a God’s eye view to do that otherwise.
Perspectival truth may well be our best bet of getting things right from a human van-
tage point—a vantage point we equally share with our historical predecessors and con-
temporary rivals. This is the only vantage point we can legitimately reclaim as our own.
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